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Aug 28, 2018
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EU Blocking Statute; EU companies abiding by US sanctions will be sanctioned by the EU

The European Union’s Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) was extended to cover emissions from shipping as of 1st January 2024.

The EU ETS is limited by a 'cap' on the number of emission allowances. Within the cap, companies receive or buy emission allowances, which they can trade as needed. The cap decreases every year, ensuring that total emissions fall.

Each allowance gives the holder the right to emit:

  • One tonne of carbon dioxide (CO2), or;
  • The equivalent amount of other powerful greenhouse gases, nitrous oxide (N2O) and perfluorocarbons (PFCs).
  • The price of one ton of CO2 allowance under the EU ETS has fluctuated between EUR 60 and almost EUR 100 in the past two years. The total cost of emissions will vary based on the cost of the allowance at the time of purchase, the vessel’s emissions profile and the total volume of voyages performed within the EU ETS area. The below is for illustration purposes:
  • ~A 30.000 GT passenger ship has total emissions of 20.000 tonnes in a reporting year, of which 9.000 are within the EU, 7.000 at berth within the EU and 4.000 are between the EU and an outside port. The average price of the allowance is EUR 75 per tonne. The total cost would be as follows:
  • ~~9.000 * EUR 75 = EUR 675.000
  • ~~7.000 * EUR 75 = EUR 525.000
  • ~~4.000 * EUR 75 * 50% = EUR 150.000
  • ~~Total = EUR 1.350.000 (of which 40% is payable in 2024)
  • For 2024, a 60% rebate is admitted to the vessels involved. However, this is reduced to 30% in 2025, before payment is due for 100% with effect from 2026.
  • Emissions reporting is done for each individual ship, where the ship submits their data to a verifier (such as a class society) which in turns allows the shipowner to issue a verified company emissions report. This report is then submitted to the administering authority, and it is this data that informs what emission allowances need to be surrendered to the authority.
  • The sanctions for non- compliance are severe, and in the case of a ship that has failed to comply with the monitoring and reporting obligations for two or more consecutive reporting periods, and where other enforcement measures have failed to ensure compliance, the competent authority of an EEA port of entry may issue an expulsion order. Where such a ship flies the flag of an EEA country and enters or is found in one of its ports, the country concerned will, after giving the opportunity to the company concerned to submit its observations, detain the ship until the company fulfils its monitoring and reporting obligations.
  • Per the EU’s Implementing Regulation, it is the Shipowner who remains ultimately responsible for complying with the EU ETS system.

There are a number of great resources on the regulatory and practical aspects of the system – none better than the EU’s own:

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02003L0087-20230605

https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/transport/reducing-emissions-shipping-sector_en

https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/eu-emissions-trading-system-eu-ets/what-eu-ets_en

Blocking Statute and US sanctions apply “inconsistent demands”
In its update on the re-imposed US Sanctions on Iran, UK Club referred to an article from law firm Gibson Dunn, “Navigating the Divide for International Business”, which added EU-perspective detail to the Iranian sanctions.

The EU enacted Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/1100 (the “Re-imposed Iran Sanctions Blocking Regulation”), which supplemented Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 (as amended, the “EU Blocking Statute”) simultaneously to the new Iran EO from the US.

Gibson Dunn said that the combined effect of the EU Blocking Statute and the Re-imposed Iran Sanctions Blocking Regulation would be to prohibit compliance by EU entities with US sanctions on Iran which have been re-imposed following the US withdrawal from the JCPOA.

The EU matched President Trump’s strident language. One senior EU official said that “if EU companies abide by US . . . sanctions they will, in turn, be sanctioned by the EU.”

As Gibson Dunn observed, the two actions appeared to place multinational companies in an impossible bind between the inconsistent demands (and rhetoric) of powerful regulators. But the law firm said that “depending upon how Washington and EU Member States choose actually to implement their respective authorities, this bind may prove navigable”.

All of the sanctions and counter-sanctions were in large part discretionary. In pre-JCPOA times, the Obama Administration had similarly broad authorities to impose “secondary sanctions” on companies around the world for transactions with Iran, but imposed such sanctions very sparingly. Similarly, the EU’s Blocking Statute had been in place in some form for nearly 20 years. In that time the EU and its member states had enforced the rules infrequently.

Gibson Dunn said that the question going forward was whether the Trump Administration, the EU, and its various Member States would more forcefully and consistently enforce these discretionary and contradictory authorities. Early indications were that, despite the language of the new regulations and the rhetoric of senior officials, there might be more flexibility on both sides of the Atlantic than might seem to be the case at first sight. However, Gibson Dunn said that this would not remove the challenges from multinational companies eager to avoid angering either European or US regulators, but it might provide a way forward.

Almost immediately after President Trump announced his intention to withdraw from the JCPOA on May 8th 2018, the European Union and senior leaders in several major EU Member States announced their intention to remain compliant with the JCPOA and to reinvigorate the EU Blocking Statute so as to continue to promote the sanctions relief that the bloc views as central to the JCPOA.

While some Member States moved to update their domestic legislation in this regard prior to the end of the first wind-down period, the EU had not formalized any changes until August 7th.

The EU Blocking Statute was designed as a counter-measure to what the EU considers to be the unlawful effects of third-country (primarily, but not exclusively, US) extra-territorial sanctions on EU operators. Its purpose was first and foremost to protect EU operators engaging in international trade, in a manner wholly compliant with EU law, but in breach of sanctions imposed by other countries. At a political level, it was also designed to display the EU’s disapproval of sanctions regimes implemented by third countries which the EU considers to be abusive or unreasonable.

The EU Blocking Statute set out a series of requirements relating to offending overseas sanctions and then (in an Annex) listed the overseas sanctions regimes to which it applied.
The Re-imposed Iran Sanctions Blocking Regulation was accompanied by an Implementing Regulation, relating to the process for EU operators to apply for authorization from the EC to comply with Blocked US Sanctions.

The EU Blocking Statute applies to a wide range of actors including:

  • any natural person being a resident in the EU and a national of an EU Member State;
  • any legal person incorporated within the EU;
  • any national of an EU Member State established outside the EU and any shipping company established outside the EU and controlled by nationals of an EU member state, if their vessels are registered in that EU member state in accordance with its legislation;
  • any other natural person being a resident in the EU, unless that person is in the country of which he is a national; and
  • any other natural person within the EU, including its territorial waters and air space and in any aircraft or on any vessel under the jurisdiction or control of an EU member state, acting in a professional capacity.

The EU’s guidance note emphasized that, when EU subsidiaries of US companies were formed in accordance with the law of an EU Member State and had their registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the EU, then they were subject to the EU Blocking Statute. However, branches of US companies in the EU were not subject to the EU Blocking Statute.

The EU Blocking Statute prohibits EU operators from complying with a set of specific extra-territorial laws or any decisions, rulings or awards based on those laws. The laws are listed and include six different US sanctions laws and one set of US regulations (OFAC’s Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations).

The EU Blocking Statute applied to all EU operators from August 7th 2018 and does not allow for any grandfathering of pre-existing contracts or agreements.
Gibson Dunn observed that the EU Guidance indicated that EU operators were prohibited from even requesting a licence from the US to maintain compliance with US sanctions. The Guidance said that merely requesting such permission – without first gaining authorization from the EU or a competent authority in a Member State to do so – was tantamount to complying with US sanctions.

The EU Blocking Statute also required EU operators to report to the EC within 30 days of any circumstances arising from the extraterritorial laws that affect their economic or financial interests.
It also held that any decision rendered in the US or elsewhere made due to the extraterritorial measures could not be implemented in the EU. Gibson Dunn observed that this meant, for instance, that any court decision made in light of the extraterritorial measures, could not be executed in the EU, “presumably even under existing mutual recognition agreements”.
Finally, the EU Blocking Statute allows EU operators to recover damages arising from the application of the extraterritorial measures, although it was not made clear how this would work in practice. Gibson Dunn said that it appeared to allow an EU operator “to exercise a private right of action and to be indemnified by companies that do comply with the US laws if in so doing those companies injure the EU operator”.
For instance, if a European company had a contract to provide certain goods to Iran. the European company would not be allowed to break that contract due to their desire to comply with US sanctions. However, if some of those goods were derived in part from other companies that have decided to comply with US measures and to cease supplying any material destined for Iran the European company might be compelled to cease its transactions with Iran. “In such case the Iranian company could sue the European company for breach of contract – the European operator could in turn sue its supplier for the damages caused due to the supplier’s compliance with the extra-territorial US sanctions.”

The UK has in place a law, the Extraterritorial US Legislation (Sanctions against Cuba, Iran and Libya) (Protection of Trading Interests) Order 1996, which broadly makes compliance with Blocked US Sanctions a criminal offence. That Order does not provide for custodial sentences, but it does provide for a potentially unlimited fine.

Certain other Member States have also opted for the creation of criminal offences. These include Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden. Other Member States, including Germany, Italy and Spain, have devised administrative penalties for non-compliance.

Meanwhile some Member States, including France, Belgium and Luxembourg, do not appear ever to have even implemented the EU Blocking Statute, notwithstanding the obligation on them as a matter of general EU law to prescribe penalties for breach of EU law which are effective, proportionate and dissuasive.

SOURCES: UK CLUB, GIBSON DUNN, INSURANCE MARINE NEWS

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